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PAYING WAGES IN KIND
— by Neil E. Harl*
 In general, wages paid in kind rather than in cash to
agricultural labor are not subject to FICA1 or FUTA2 taxes.
In addition, agricultural labor is exempt from income tax
withholding3 except as the payment constitutes "wages."4
Wages paid "in any medium other than cash for agricultural
labor" are exempt from the term "wages."5
Recent rulings (and apparent Internal Revenue Service
scrutiny of the practice) have focused attention on the issue
although neither the practice of paying wages in kind nor the
authority for unique tax treatment of such in kind payments
is new.
Income to the employer
An important aspect of in-kind wage payments is that the
employer must report any gain on the in-kind payment into
income.6  Typically, the commodity used to make the wage
payment has a zero income tax basis so the entire amount is
reportable as income.  In a late 1991 ruling, a farmer paid
wages to the spouse in the form of hogs and was required to
report the hogs as income.7  In that ruling, the IRS agreed
that the wages paid in kind were considered as compensation
for purposes of the spouse's contribution to an Individual
Retirement Account.8
Deduction for employee
The employer may claim an income tax deduction for the
wages paid if income tax is withheld as required by I.R.C. §
3402.9  Inasmuch as wages paid to agricultural labor are
exempt from withholding if paid in kind,10 income tax is
withheld as required by I.R.C. § 3402 so a wage deduction is
clearly available.
Dominion and control by employer
For in-kind wage payments to be exempt from FICA,
FUTA and income tax withholding, the payment must not
be in a form readily converted into cash and the employee
must exercise dominion and control over the payment.
Several rulings have addressed those requirements —
•   Payment in the form of commodity storage receipts
was treated in a 1979 ruling as a payment in cash.11  Thus,
the wages  were not  considered to have been paid in kind and
*
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the special statutory provisions applicable to agricultural
labor did not  apply.
•   In a 1982 private letter ruling,12 wages paid in the
form of milk and other commodities by a corporation
carrying on a dairy operation met the requirements for
avoiding the payroll taxes.  The employees were
compensated with a percentage of the milk produced, a
percentage of the calves and a percentage of grain
production.13
•  A 1991 private letter ruling, however, held an in-kind
payment to be the equivalent of cash where a spouse was
paid $200 per month in cash and 3,000 pounds of live hogs
per month.14  In that situation, title to the hogs was
transferred to the spouse on delivery to the market.15
Clearly, the spouse as employee failed to exercise any
meaningful dominion and control over the hogs.
The requirement that the employee exercise dominion and
control over the commodity constituting payment in kind
poses relatively few problems for payments in passive form
such as grain or  soybeans.  However, the employee should
either pay storage for the period after the wage payment and
before sale or include the value of storage as additional
income.  For payment of wages in the form of livestock, the
employee should be responsible for the care, feeding and
management of the animals from the time of wage payment
until sale.
Reporting of wage by employee
The payment of a wage in kind should be reportable as
"other income" on the Form W-2 and is fully reportable as
income by the employee.  If the commodity increases or
decreases in value after wage payment, the gain or loss
should be reported on Schedule D with the wage payment
amount treated as the employee's income tax basis in the
commodity.  Gains should not be treated as self-employment
income unless the employee is considered to be engaged in
the trade or business of producing the commodity.
Effect on benefits
The payment of wages in kind may threaten eligibility
for disability benefits and may reduce or eliminate  benefits.
For that reason, some pay a portion of the wages in cash and
the rest in kind.
82                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 3121(a)(8).
2 I.R.C. § 3306(b)(11).
3 I.R.C. § 3401(a)(2).
4 See I.R.C. § 3121(a).
5 I.R.C. § 3121(a)(8).
6 See Ltr. Rul. 9202003, no date
given.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(2).
1 0 See I.R.C. §§ 3401(a)(2), 3121(a),
3121(a)(8).
1 1 Rev. Rul. 79-207,1979-2 C.B. 351.
1 2 Ltr. Rul. 8252018, Sept. 17, 1982.
1 3 Id.
1 4 Ltr. Rul. 9136001, May 14, 1991.
1 5 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . The debtor made
payment of a bona fide debt by a check mailed on November
18, dated November 19 and honored by the bank on
November 20.  For purposes of Section 547, the payment
was not an avoidable transfer if made before November 20.
The court held that the date of a payment for preferential
transfer purposes was the date the check was honored by the
bank; therefore, the payment was avoidable. Barnhill v .
Johnson, 112 S.Ct. 1386 (1992), aff'g , 9 3 1
F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991).
ESTATE PROPERTY.  The IRS filed a pre-petition
tax lien and notice of levy against an account receivable of
the debtor.  The debtor sought use of the account receivable
as cash collateral during the bankruptcy case but the IRS
argued that the levy removed any interest of the debtor in the
property.  The court held that the account receivable was
estate property subject to use as cash collateral until the
property was sold at a tax sale.  In re  Anaheim Elec .
Motor, Inc., 137 B.R. 791 (Bankr. C.D. Cal .
1992) .
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS .  The debtor, an
agricultural equipment dealer sought to assume dealership
contracts with the equipment manufacturer, under which the
manufacturer provided floor plan financing and financing of
purchases by customers.  The manufacturer argued that
Section 365(c)(2) prevented assumption of the contracts
because the contracts involved financial accommodation of
the debtor.  The court held that the financing arrangements
were only incidental to what were primarily business
arrangement contracts and the debtor was allowed to assume
the contracts.  In re Cole Bros., Inc., 137 B.R. 6 4 7
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS.
EARNINGS.  As part of its efforts to collect on a
judgment, the plaintiff attached the proceeds of the sale of
milk by the debtor to a dairy.  The debtor objected, arguing
that the milk proceeds were exempt from attachment as
earnings under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 427.010.  The court held
that the proceeds of the sale of milk were not earnings
eligible for the exemption.  Rice, Seiller, et al. v .
Fitzgerald, 824 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. Ct. App.
1992) .
HOMESTEAD.  The debtor claimed a residence as a
homestead.  The debtor had once lived in the residence
fulltime but moved to two other houses which the debtor
built in attempts to sell the houses.  After the other houses
were sold, the debtor moved back to the residence which was
rented out during the debtor's absence.  The court held that
the debtor could claim the residence as an exempt
homestead. The debtor did not abandon the residence as a
homestead because the debtor always intended to move back
once the other houses were sold.  In re  Inmom, 1 3 7
B.R. 757 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).
The debtors sold their Oregon homestead after moving to
Colorado to obtain work.  The debtors sought exemption of
the proceeds under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-201 which
provided for an exemption of proceeds of a homestead
located in Colorado.  Notwithstanding the literal language of
the exemption statute, the court held that the proceeds would
be exempt as fullfilling the purposes of the homestead
exemption.  In re  Bloedon, 137 B.R. 824 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1992).
LIEN AVOIDANCE.  The farm debtors sought to avoid
a lien against the proceeds of farm machinery because the
lien impaired their exemption in the farm machinery.  The
lien creditor argued that the exemption, under Wis. Stat. §
815.18(2)(h), was not allowed because the debtors had no
equity in the machinery and the lien was consensual.  The
creditor also argued that because Wisconsin had not "opted
out" of the federal exemptions, the Wisconsin limitations
on the exemption were permissable because the debtors
could elect to use the federal exemptions for lien avoidance
purposes.  The court held that under Owen v. Owen, 111
S.Ct. 1833 (1991), a state limitation on an exemption did
not affect the lien avoidance provisions of federal bankruptcy
law; therefore, the lien could be avoided.  In re  Wink,
137 B.R. 297 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1992).
In divorce proceedings, the debtor's former husband's
attorney obtained a charging interest against the former
husband's interest in the marital residence.  Under the
divorce settlement, the debtor obtained the former husband's
interest in the property subject to the charging lien.  The
court held that the debtor could not avoid the lien as
impairing the homestead exemption because the lien
attached before the debtor obtained an interest in the
property. In re  Donovan, 137 B.R. 547 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1992).
